Canada
Commons

The Democratic Deficit in Canadian ICT Policy and Regulation[1]

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Writing in 1958, Raymond Williams sounds as though he is describing the contemporary political scene, in which the casting of bricks at plate-glass windows has come to be viewed by many as a more efficacious political act than the casting of votes: "If people cannot have official democracy, they will have unofficial democracy, in any of its possible forms, from the armed revolt or riot…to the quietest but most alarming form – a general sullenness and withdrawal of interest." To this, Williams adds: "These characteristic marks of our civilization are symptoms of a basic failure in *communication*."[2] Clearly, the problem of the relationship between democracy and communication is not a new one.

Still, one wonders whether, in 1958, just over halfway through "Canada's Century," anyone would have imagined that its close would be marked by a political condition in which violent state repression of popular demonstrations on the one hand, and a climate of widespread disaffection and disengagement on the other, had become routine to the point of being unable to astonish us. Some would argue that a capitalist society such as Canada, in which significant disparities in wealth and power are a material fact of the economy, could never really be a democracy, at least not in the sense of achieving a radically equal distribution of social resources and effective political power.

However, one need not adopt such a demanding stance in order to recognize that democratic politics and citizenship are experiencing a serious decline in Canada, and that Canadians are deeply dissatisfied with the state of democratic institutions and practices in this country. This decline is manifest in a number of ways: declining rates of formal participation in voting and political parties; declining levels of political capacity and knowledge; rising levels of distrust in, and disaffection with, representative institutions and practices; declining levels of civic engagement.[3] A decade of neoliberal restructuring in the Canadian economy appears to have exorcised the phantoms of fiscal deficits over the same period that the so-called democratic deficit has grown unchecked.

It is also instructive to note that this democratic deficit has grown over precisely the same period that a range of formidable new technologies has occupied the Canadian communication landscape. The coincidence of the spread of digital information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the decline of democracy in Canada is, at the very least, curious. After all, it is one of our deepest political intuitions that instruments which enable information access and communication *must* be good for democratic citizenship, because democratic citizenship relies so heavily on the freedom to access and distribute information and to communicate. In the passage cited above, Williams identifies the problem of civic withdrawal with a failure in communication; he goes on to suggest that the solution lies in "adopting a different attitude to [communication] – one which will ensure that its origins are genuinely multiple, and that all the sources have access to the common channels."[4] That sounds a lot like the Internet, or at least its idealized version, as presented by those who associate its particular properties – speed and reach; decentralized architecture; potential for interactive engagement; immediate, widespread publication; access to voluminous information – with a democratic renaissance. Surely, according to the mythology surrounding the development of the Internet, a technology that does all this can only complement democracy, and *maybe even save it.*

Is the relationship between ICTs and democracy this simple? The history of mass media in modern liberal-capitalist societies suggests that the relationship between the new technologies and democracy is unlikely to be automatically and unambiguously positive. It is far from clear that we should reflexively assume that the Internet will erase the democratic deficit rather than contribute to it. It is at least as likely that this technology will be invested with the political character of the environment in which it is situated, that it will be a site in which the democratic tensions present in Canadian society play themselves out.

These considerations provide the context for an investigation of the democratic implications of the rise of new ICTs in Canada. In 2001, the Centre for Canadian Studies at Mount Allison University initiated a three-year project called *Canada Today: A Democratic Audit*.[5] The *Audit* is intended to provide a wide-ranging assessment of the democratic character of political life and institutions in Canada. It comprises ten separate volumes examining a variety of key democratic institutions, actors, and venues in Canada. The word "audit" originates in the Latin verb *audire* for 'to hear': the *Audit* seeks to provide a publicly-accessible, critical "hearing" in which the contemporary state of Canadian democracy is called to account. To this end, the studies gathered by the *Audit* cohere around a set of three common evaluative criteria: participation, responsiveness, and inclusiveness. Thus, the *Audit* attempts to address the following questions: how *participatory* is Canadian democracy? how *responsive* are our political institutions? and how *inclusive* is our public decision-making? Included among the studies gathered by the *Audit* is a volume examining the relationship between new ICTs and contemporary democracy in Canada.[6] Are new ICTs alleviating the democratic deficit in Canada, by contributing to a more participatory, inclusive and responsive politics? What follows is a brief sketch of findings that emerged from this portion of the *Audit*.

Auditing ICTs in Canada

Is it fair to say that ICTs have contributed to a political life in Canada that can be described as more *democratic* – more *participatory*, *inclusive*, and *responsive* – than politics before the so-called "information revolution"? In trying to address this question, I have concentrated on three separate aspects or levels of the relationship between democratic politics and communication technology. The first is the extent to which the development and deployment of technology is itself subjected to democratic deliberation and direction. The second pertains to the manner in which political actors and institutions put communication technologies to use in their political practices. The third refers to the manner in which communication technologies contribute to a material environment in which democratic politics are either supported or undermined. I will briefly summarize the findings of the *Audit* in the first of these three areas.

ICTs as a Political Issue

The first level of relationship between democracy and ICTs is the level at which these technologies themselves, in their development and application, are constructed as a political issue that is either open or closed to deliberation and decision-making that is substantively democratic. If democracy is a system of government in which citizens are engaged as equals in open-ended discussion and decisions about how they will live together (i.e., about how power and resources will be distributed; about which social practices will be supported and which will be discouraged or prohibited), and if technologies locate power, and are constitutive of shared arrangements for living together, then a democratic society will be one in which fundamental decisions about technology are subjected to democratic political processes. Thus, if we are interested in whether ICTs make for a more democratic society, the first question we have to ask is whether the development and

application of those technologies *themselves* have been subjected to inclusive, participatory, and responsive democratic politics.

Of course, there are a number of points at which we can imagine democratic politics intervening in the development of a technology. It is not impossible, for example, to conceive of democratic politics coming to bear on questions of technology directly at the levels of engineering and design (though technological cultures such as those in Canada and the United States have rarely considered this an option worthy of systemic attention). Another, less radical, point at which democratic politics can be brought to bear on technology is in policy-making and regulation. Policy and regulatory decisions matter decisively to the development and application of technology, and they are also parts of the political process to which it is not unreasonable to attach democratic expectations.

This is especially true with regard to the development and application of communication technologies in the Canadian context. Historically – in recognition of their complex relationship to the public interest in Canadian culture, democracy, sovereignty and economy – policy and regulation surrounding communication technologies and their application have been subjected to relatively high levels of institutionalized democratic engagement. Certainly, the Canadian record on participatory, responsive and inclusive democratic engagement in communication policy-making is far from ideal. Still, in a trajectory that begins in a very limited way with the Mulock Committee's (1905) deliberations around the organization of the telegraph system in Canada, and continues through the Aird (1928) and Massey Commissions (1929) and a host of subsequent exercises, it is conspicuous of the Canadian experience that issues involving communication technology have been approached in a manner that is almost idiosyncratically democratic, relative to other policy areas and other national jurisdictions. As McDowell and Buchwald point out, when it comes to communication, "any significant reworking of public policies in Canada has, by convention and common practice, been accompanied by extensive consultation processes with many groups in society."[7] Marc Raboy reaches a similar conclusion in regard to the develop-

ment of Canadian broadcasting policy: "As far as the basic legislative and policy framework is concerned, a deep-rooted tradition stemming from the early days of radio in Canada ensures that no major change in the system can be instated, or even seriously contemplated, without public consultation. The transparency and extent of public debates regarding broadcasting policymaking in Canada is unique in the world."[8] The regulation of communication in Canada has also exhibited at least a quasi-democratic aspect via the institution of public notices and hearings conducted by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).

So there is nothing unreasonable or naïve about expecting that the policy and regulatory processes surrounding ICTs should involve substantial and meaningful democratic engagement – indeed anything less than this would be contrary to Canada's historical norms in this area. The question is whether the ICT policy and regulatory cycle to date has observed these norms.

The findings of the *Audit* are that it has not. The ICT policy and regulatory cycle has exhibited a significant departure from the historical norms of democratic engagement in communication policymaking and regulation in Canada. The *Audit* highlights three decisive moments in the ICT policy cycle beginning in 1993, when Industry Canada took responsibility for the development of Canada's digital communication infrastructure: the establishment in 1993 of the Canadian Network for the Advancement of Research, Industry and Education (CANARIE); the proceedings of the Information Highway Advisory Council (IHAC); and the National Broadband Task Force (NBTF). The *Audit* also looks at two key moments in the development of the regulatory regime for ICTs, the CRTC's reports on Competition and Convergence (1995), and New Media (1999).

CANARIE

One of Industry Canada's first acts was to create CANARIE, whose initial task it was to oversee the upgrade of Canada's Internet backbone

but which, in 1997, would proceed to privatize and commercialize this backbone, when control was transferred from the National Research Council to Bell Advanced Communication. This was not the first time that it was necessary to decide whether a new communication technology in Canada – especially its basic infrastructure – should be owned, operated, and regulated publicly or privately. As suggested above, whenever a technological change forced re-examination of this question in the past, a widespread process of democratic public consultation was undertaken prior to the decision being made. Not so this time. Instead, as Donald Gutstein describes, "An important, perhaps critical decision was made about the kind of information networks Canadians would enjoy in the future, yet they heard nothing about it...In fact, most Canadians were unaware that major decisions were being made...These issues were never debated on their merits, at least not in public...[The decision to privatize] had been made quietly, without public consultation."[9]

It could be argued that this quite dramatic departure from the tradition of public participation reflected the non-inclusive character of CANARIE's membership: twelve of the fifteen members of CANARIE's first board were from private sector companies with direct interests in telecommunications, including the Stentor group of telephone companies, Northern Telecom, Unitel/AT&T, IBM and representatives from the Information Technology Association of Canada, a lobby group representing 1,200 computer and communication firms. Thus did CANARIE fail to meet the standards of inclusiveness and participation necessary for it to qualify as a democratic body in any meaningful sense.

IHAC

This set the stage for Industry Canada's establishment in 1994 of IHAC, whose mandate it was to advise the Canadian government on a comprehensive policy strategy for the development of a national digital communications infrastructure. In a sense, IHAC was to be to the Internet

what Aird was to radio, and Massey was to television. Unfortunately, IHAC would depart from the tradition of Canadian communication policy-making established by its predecessors in one key respect: its neglect of the democratic imperatives of inclusive participation and public engagement. Over 2,000 people volunteered to sit on IHAC. In the end, the Council was comprised of thirty members, nineteen (or two-thirds) of whom were from the private sector, including eight representatives from major telecommunications, broadcasting and computing firms – Bell, IBM, Rogers, Unitel, Videotron, etc. The remaining members of the Council were from the (nominal) public sector, and included several academics and university/school administrators, consumer advocates, local and regional computer network administrators, a writer, labour leaders, and, notably, the chair of the Coalition for Public Information.

In its report, IHAC portrayed its membership as representing "a diverse range of interests" – a plausible characterization, but debatable, especially given the near two-thirds majority enjoyed by private sector organizations, and the over-representation of firms with vested interests in this area, whose ideological convictions were anything but diverse.

More serious, in terms of the norm of inclusive and participatory public engagement in communication policy-making, is the fact that IHAC held no public hearings, and accepted no unsolicited submissions. Instead, IHAC's monthly meetings, and the meetings of its five subsidiary working groups, were held in private. The working groups of IHAC accepted a total of 64 invited briefs, but these were not presented in person at a public meeting, and they were made public only in summaries prepared by a consultant hired by IHAC. The scholarly literature on this process has been nearly uniform in characterizing IHAC as problematic from a democratic perspective, representing a "closed style [that] suggests an unwillingness to consult the public."[10] According to McDowell and Buchwald, IHAC's proceedings were "a significant break" from past practices in similar bodies.[11] As Gutstein has observed: "The secretive, closely controlled, corporate-dominated machinations of IHAC contrast starkly with the broad public debate

that occurred in Canada in the late 1920s over the commercialization and Americanization of radio airwaves."[12]

This is not to say that public interest organizations were not animated by the IHAC proceedings. It has been well-documented that a diverse array of public interest groups mobilized in response to the IHAC process, including the Public Information Highway Advisory Council, a group named in protest over the lack of public access to the IHAC process, and the Alliance for a Connected Canada. It is important to note that groups such as these far exceeded IHAC itself in terms of inclusiveness and participation. What is also significant from a democratic perspective, however, is just how marginal these groups were to the policy-making process in this instance. Lacking a formal opportunity to participate directly in IHAC deliberations, public interest organizations were forced to organize parallel proceedings aimed at raising public awareness, or to try to influence potentially sympathetic IHAC members through informal, ad hoc channels.

The effects of these noble, but marginal, efforts have also been well documented. As Andrew Clement, Leslie Shade and Marita Moll characterized it: "These activities strengthened the connections between the groups. They have clearly articulated a broadly shared vision...and had some influence on the wording of official policy recommendations. However, there has so far been *no discernible effect on actual policies or practices*, and there is little prospect that further efforts in the same direction will change the situation."[13]

It is important to point out this radical departure from the tradition of widespread public consultation in communication policy-making was the result of IHAC's intentions and design. At the time, IHAC's Director, David Johnston, conceded that "the mandate of the Council did not call for a broadly-based public consultation process."[14] And when he announced IHAC's formation, Industry Minister John Manley was similarly forthcoming: "We want to hear from them in a candid way. We want the flexibility of an *in camera* discussion."[15] Thus, arguably the most important policy process directing the shape of Canada's encounter with digital technologies was designed explicitly to exclude or minimize public participation and democratic consultation.

The undemocratic nature of this process had a decisive impact upon the policy recommendations formulated by IHAC, insofar as it ensured that certain perspectives and options would not be voiced effectively, while others – those of the industry stakeholders represented on the Council itself – would receive disproportionate exposure. The first final report issued by IHAC recommended what could best be described as a gift to the major industrial interests that comprised the bulk of the council's membership: an approach that affirmed the undeniable urgency of facilitating technological development, but in which primary control over the specifics of this development would be handed over to the private sector and market interests. IHAC's first recommendation captures the spirit of the report perfectly: "In the new information economy, success will be determined by the marketplace, not by government. Hence, the primary role of the government should be to set the ground rules and to act as a model user to inspire Canadians. The private sector should build and operate the Information Highway."[16]

Such a categorical expression of faith in the market to deliver a distribution of communication resources capable of serving the diverse cultural and political needs of Canadians in the context of a continental media economy was, like the process that produced it, a significant departure from well-established norms in this area. This outcome was so unresponsive to concerns other than those of the vested private interests that dominated IHAC, that the Council's token labour representatives were moved to protest. Rod Hiebert, President of the Telecommunications Workers Union, withdrew from IHAC and asked that his name be withheld from the final report, "because of the Council's adamant refusal to address a range of social issues."[17] Jean Claude-Parrot of the Canadian Labour Congress remained on the Council, but issued a dissenting minority report in which he argued that IHAC had sacrificed the public interest (regarding, for example, the impact of information technology on work and employment) in order to secure the private interests of the telecommunication industry.

NBTF

The IHAC experience, both in terms of process and outcome, was more or less replicated in 2000, when Industry Canada established the NBTF to advise the federal government on approaches to making high-speed Internet access available across the country. David Johnston, formerly the chair of IHAC, was appointed to lead the NBTF. Johnson would describe the NBTF as "an eclectic group from public and private sector backgrounds…united by a desire to build a better country by absorbing and focusing ideas and experience from all our citizens," but a close look at its membership suggests otherwise.[18] Of the NBTF's thirty-four members, twenty-three were from the private sector, including several representatives from Canada's major telecommunications, computer, cable, and Internet service providers. Also involved were seven "participating associations," five of which represented industrial interests in the communication sector.

As far as consultation beyond its unrepresentative membership is concerned, the NBTF received just 60 public submissions via mail or the Internet. It held no public hearings, and deliberated privately in five meetings held between January and May 2001. In the past, contemplation of a project on the scale of a new national communication infrastructure might have provided an occasion to engage Canadians in open, inclusive democratic deliberation about the public interest. In this case, the opportunity was forgone in favour of an exclusive, private conversation among vested interests.

Once again, the link between an undemocratic process and its outcome is hard to miss. Adopting the spirit of CANARIE and IHAC, the NBTF affirmed that the "new national dream" of broadband required that billions of dollars of public money be spent to build an infrastructure, control over which would be surrendered to private interests and market forces. The report recommends that "the private sector should play a leadership role in the development and operation of broadband networks and services," while "governments should facilitate the deployment of broadband networks, services and content through policies and regulations that favour private sector investment,

competition and innovation..." Rather than enforcing universal service obligations upon the private enterprises that would profit from offering broadband services, governments would have to buck up and "deploy broadband infrastructure to communities unlikely to be served by market forces alone." Even in this, governments should be "guided" by "the value of open, competitive markets" once the publicly-subsidized infrastructure is in place.[19] Thus, the NBTF reads like a neoliberal playbook of sorts, setting out in clear terms a model for the private takeover and exploitation of public communication infrastructure.

CRTC

The *Audit* also examines two crucial efforts undertaken by the CRTC with respect to ICT regulation – the processes that led to its 1995 report on Competition and Convergence (which addressed the question of whether the separation between content and carriage should be maintained in light of increased competition in the telephone industry and the digital convergence of telecommunications and broadcasting), and its 1999 Report on New Media (which addressed the question of whether the CRTC should exercise regulatory authority over the Internet).[20]

Both of these processes involved public consultation processes that were far more participatory and inclusive than anything engaged in by CANARIE, IHAC or the NBTF. In the convergence hearings, the CRTC received 1,085 written submissions and heard 78 oral submissions at public hearings held in Ottawa over three weeks in March 1995. Predictably, most of these submissions came from telephone, cable, broadcast, and entertainment companies, and labour and consumer groups, who typically intervene in CRTC proceedings. However, the hearings also engendered engagement beyond this constituency, evidenced in what has been described as "a spontaneous flood of submissions from newly-formed public interest groups and activists frustrated until now by the closed-door process established by IHAC.

A flurry of grassroots activity resulted in submissions and requests to address the Commission from numerous Canadians who had never before appeared at a hearing."[21] Groups such as the Coalition for Public Information, Telecommunities Canada, and the Public Information Highway Advisory Council (P-IHAC) made articulate submissions that raised the possibility of alternatives to the industrial, market-based approaches that had dominated policy surrounding the development of Canada's digital information and communication infrastructure.

Similarly, during its New Media hearings, the CRTC received well over 1,000 written submissions, and nearly 100 parties made public oral presentations. According to the report: "This proceeding was unprecedented in terms of the broad spectrum of individuals, industries, and interest groups from whom the Commission received comments."[22] Once again, the CRTC had provided a forum for democratic engagement in communication policy and regulatory issues that was far more inclusive and participatory than that experienced in the federal government's IHAC exercise.

Where the CRTC processes failed, in democratic terms, was in the *non-responsiveness* of their outcomes. In its convergence report, the CRTC decided that the separation between control over carriage and control over content could not be justified or sustained in a competitive marketplace and in light of technological convergence – a decision that paved the way for subsequent licensing decisions allowing major telecommunication service providers to merge with major broadcasting and print enterprises, creating in Canada what has become, in terms of ownership, one of the most consolidated and concentrated communications markets in the world. In its report on New Media, the CRTC decided categorically that it would refrain from exercising regulatory authority over the Internet, deciding that competition between private interests in markets would attend to public interest in this vital new medium of public communication.

These outcomes reflected the government's overarching industrial policy agenda for the Information Highway, as well as the interests of the major industrial players involved. It is not clear, however, that they can be characterized as responsive to the broad range of social con-

cerns expressed in the considerable process of public engagement that preceded them – concerns which, to generalize, did not exactly equate a heavily concentrated and lightly regulated communication market with the public interest. As Clement, Moll and Shade have written: "Despite the unusually high level of public interest and activity seeking a unique national vision of the evolving information and communication infrastructure, the CRTC did not risk diverging from the official path established by Industry Canada which, in the end, has the power to overturn any CRTC ruling."[23] As a regulatory body, the CRTC was constrained at the outset by clearly established policy priorities from which it could not reasonably have been expected to deviate, even in response to alternative priorities expressed at its own hearings. Indeed, one analyst has gone so far as to characterize these CRTC proceedings as "show hearings," in which public policy and regulatory decisions that had already been taken elsewhere were given a superficial gloss of democratic legitimacy.[24]

Conclusion

What emerges from this part of the *Audit* is a clear picture that the priorities of public policy on new information and communication technologies have, to date, been other than democratic. Instead, policy in this area has reflected the priority of unfettered technological innovation and growth, and a complementary determination to develop these technologies in ways that maximize their potential as media of industry, commerce, and economic accumulation. In the current climate, it is no surprise that these priorities have been operationalized in an approach to communication policy and regulation that is best described as neoliberal, in which the development, deployment, and exploitation of ICTs is given over to powerful corporate actors pursuing their private interests in relatively unfettered markets.[25] The state is neither absent nor innocent in this complex: it remains on hand to institutionalize this model, to secure markets and property, to entice investment by minimizing the social obligations of capital-

ist enterprise, and to subsidize where private capital sees no prospect of immediate return. What changes, at least relative to the history of communication policy and regulation in Canada, is that the state ceases to be an instrument through which the democratic populace can try to enforce the public interest against the vagaries of the market and its most powerful private agents. It is here that the undemocratic nature of the ICT policy and regulatory cycle becomes manifest, not only at the level of process, but also at the level of outcome.

Depending on how you look at it, it could be argued that a commitment to these priorities for this technology has been crucial to the success of the Canadian economy over the past decade or so. Even if this is true, it is not decisive: in the age of globalization, we have shown that we are more than willing to sacrifice democratic autonomy for material gain, even it is unevenly distributed. But the question the *Democratic Audit* directs us to ask is not whether the Canadian economy is prosperous; it directs us to ask whether Canadian public life in recent years has been adequately participatory, responsive and inclusive. In particular, the *Audit* asks whether Canadian democracy is better, or worse off, for its encounter with new information and communication technologies.

That is a complicated question. In this paper I have suggested that one aspect of its answer has to involve consideration of whether the development of these technologies has itself been subjected to democratic processes that are sufficiently participatory, inclusive, and responsive, and that one way to measure this is to examine the processes and outcomes of public policy and regulation in relation to these technologies. On this measure, it would be hard to sustain a claim that the development of ICTs in Canada has been an unambiguously good thing for Canadian democracy. Disconnected from the tradition of relatively democratic communication policy-making in Canada, our approach to the development of ICTs has failed quite spectacularly to meet the standards of participation, responsiveness, and inclusiveness that distinguish democracy from other forms of government. This failure has been manifest in processes that have drastically truncated opportunities for inclusive public participation, and in outcomes that

de-politicize technological issues by surrendering them to the determinations of private actors in markets.

In this respect, at least, new information and communication technologies have occasioned a contraction, rather than an expansion, of democratic public life in this country. Perhaps, looking at these technologies as *instruments* of democratic practice, or as an *environment* in which political action takes place, we might reach other conclusions. Still, even if we find democratic gains in the political practices mediated by these technologies as instruments, or in the potential contribution they make to the democratic public sphere, the significance of these gains can only be appreciated in relation to the apparently diminishing possibility of subjecting these technologies *themselves* to democratic citizenship and governance.

That being said, the ICT policy and regulatory cycle is far from completed and, as several studies elsewhere in this volume document, the democratic energy of public interest advocates and organizations is unlikely to be exhausted any time soon. Exposing the ideological character of claims about the *necessarily* democratic character of ICTs (not to mention the Canadian state) should serve to bolster their efforts.

Endnotes

1 This chapter is adapted from a lecture entitled 'A Most Delightful Outing': Democracy and Canadian Communication Policy from Mulock to IHAC, presented as part of the series *Canada Today: A Democratic Audit*, sponsored by Centre for Canadian Studies, Mount Allison University. Sackville, New Brunswick, Nov. 22, 2002. I gratefully acknowledge the Centre and the Harold Crabtree Foundation for their support of this research.

2 Williams, Raymond. (1983). *Culture and Society 1780–1950*. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 315. Emphasis added.

3 Political scientists have documented these trends exhaustively and conclusively. See, for example: Blais, Andre and Elisabeth Gidengil. (1991). *Making Representative Democracy Work: The Views of Canadians*. Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Research Studies vol. 17. Toronto: Dundurn Press.

Nevitte, Neil. (1996). *The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value-Change in Cross-National Perspective*. Peterborough: Broadview Press.

Nevitte, Neil et. al. (1999). *Unsteady State: The 1997 Canadian General Election*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

and Young, Lisa. (1998). Value Clash: Parliament and Citizens after 150 Years of Responsible Government in Seidle, Leslie and Louis Massicotte (eds.). *Taking Stock of 150 Years of Responsible Government in Canada*. Ottawa: Canadian Study of Parliament Group.

4   Williams. (1983). *Culture and Society 1780–1950*. p. 316.

5   See the project website at www.mta.ca/faculty/arts/canadian_studies/audit. htm. 15 May 2003.

6   Barney, Darin. (2004). *The Digital Mosaic: Democracy, Communication and Technology in Canada*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

7   McDowell, Stephen and Cheryl Buchwald. (1997). Consultation on communications policies: public interest groups and the I H A C. Information Policy Research Program, Faculty of Information Studies, University of Toronto. Working Paper #4. 1997. p.14

8   Raboy, Marc. (1995). The Role of Public Consultation in Shaping the Canadian Broadcasting System. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*. 28:2, p. 455.

9   Gutstein, Donald. (1999). *E.con: How the Internet Undermines Democracy*. Toronto: Stoddart, p.87–93.

10 Dowding, Martin. (2001). National information infrastructure development in Canada and the U.S.: (re) defining universal service and universal access in the age of techno-economic convergence. Doctoral dissertation. Faculty of Information Studies: University of Toronto, p. 131

11 McDowell and Buchwald, Consultation on communication policies, p. 4

12 Gutstein, (1999) p.115.

13 Clement, Andrew, Marita Moll and Leslie Regan Shade. (2001). Debating universal access in the Canadian context: the role of public interest organizations. In *E-commerce vs. e-commons: communications in the public interest*, eds. M. Moll and L.R. Shade. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. p. 43.

14 Quoted in Dowding, National information infrastructure development in Canada and the U.S, p. 127.

15 Quoted in Austen, Ian. (1994) Federal advisers on information highway taking a secret route. *Vancouver Sun*. 17 March. D7.

16 Canada. Information Highway Advisory Council. (1995). *Connection, community, content: the challenge of the information highway*. Final Report of the Information Highway Advisory Council. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services. ix.

17 McDowell and Buchwald, Consultation on communication policies, p. 22.

18 Canada. National Broadband Task Force. (2001). *The new national dream: networking the nation for broadband access.* Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, p. i.

19 Ibid, p. 3–5.

20 Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. (1995). *Competition and culture on Canada's information highway: managing the realities of transition.* Ottawa. 19 May, 1995; and (2003) *Report on New Media.* Ottawa. 17 May.

21 Clement, Moll and Shade. (2001), p. 29.

22 CRTC, *Report on New Media*, p. 3.

23 Clement, Moll and Shade. (2001), p.29.

24 Gutstein, (1999), p. 73.

25 This process cannot be effectively separated from the various processes gathered within the horizon of 'globalization.' An entirely separate chapter of this volume of the Audit addresses in detail the relationship between ICTs, policy and globalization. See Barney, *The Digital Mosaic*, Chapter 3.